State mental health parity laws improve equity in private insurance coverage for mental and physical health services, but prior research shows no effect on service use. We study whether state parity differentially affects individuals by employer size since large firms are often exempt from state health mandates due to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. We also examine whether state parity laws differentially affect use among individuals with low incomes or in poor mental health. We find that individuals in smaller firms are more likely to use services post-parity implementation and that this effect is concentrated among low-income individuals.
Historically, private insurance coverage for mental health care has been more limited than for general health care. Benefits for mental health commonly include higher costsharing and deductibles, annual outpatient visit limits, and annual inpatient day limits (U.S. DOL 2005) . One study reported, for example, that 74% of privately insured workers were subject to outpatient visit limits, 64% were subject to inpatient day limits, and 22% had higher cost-sharing for mental health care compared with other services (Barry et al. 2003) . As of 2007, more than 40 states have enacted some type of parity mandate to address this disparity in coverage, although these laws vary widely in their scope. The U.S. Congress took a first step toward enacting federal insurance parity with the passage of the 1996 Mental Health Parity Act, a law eliminating the use of annual or lifetime dollar limits on mental health coverage. However, this law did not address other types of benefit design limits.
If mental health care is treated equivalently to general health care, the out-of-pocket price of mental health care declines and greater use of these services is expected. Estimates from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) indicate a demand price elasticity for mental health of 2.80 (Manning, Wells, and Buchanan 1989 ). Yet, evaluations of state parity laws suggest these laws have had minimal or no impact on utilization (Bao and Sturm 2004; Sturm 2000; Pacula and Sturm 2000) . These findings have been cited as evidence that state parity laws are not fulfilling the goals of policymakers.
The finding that parity laws are not associated with increased utilization is puzzling. There are at least three possible explanations why researchers have failed to find impacts on utilization. First, prior state parity studies have not addressed the impact of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), a law enacted in 1974 exempting firms that self-insure from complying with state insurance mandates (Buchmueller et al. 2007) . Second, in response to parity mandates, insurers or firms may use other methods to curtail mental health care use. Some evidence suggests that, in response to parity mandates, employers and health insurers increase supply-side constraints (i.e., mental health carve-outs, utilization review, more restrictive networks) (Barry and Ridgely 2008 ) that reduce service use, perhaps back to a ''target'' level, resulting in stable aggregate utilization rates. A third explanation is that there truly is no significant demand response to a reduced out-of-pocket price of mental health care (Meyerhoefer and Zuvekas 2006) . The RAND HIE was conducted 30 years ago, and in the interim, significant changes have occurred in treatment for mental disorders. Demand for outpatient mental health services may be more inelastic today due to increased treatment in primary care or increased use of psychotropic drugs to treat mental health conditions. Both pharmaceutical and primary care-based treatment options are typically not subject to differential cost-sharing and therefore are not affected by parity legislation.
The policy implications of these three explanations are quite different. If the lack of a measurable utilization change is due to researchers misclassifying individuals exempt from parity laws due to ERISA as subject to these laws, state parity laws may have positive effects on access to care undetected in prior research. This explanation suggests the importance of a comprehensive federal law preempting the ERISA exemption. Alternatively, if parity laws do not affect use because of an increase in supply-side constraints, there may be unmeasured efficiency gains from these policies. It is well-established that many individuals with diagnosable mental disorders do not receive treatment (U.S. DHHS 1999) . Moreover, many individuals who receive treatment have no diagnosable disorders (U.S. DHHS 1999) , although these individuals still may benefit from treatment (Druss et al. 2007 ). If supply-side constraints, such as utilization review, are superior to demandside constraints in allocating services across individuals in accordance with need, parity regulations may yield no aggregate change in use, but may affect who receives services. Finally, if there truly is no effect of parity (or reduced out-of-pocket price) on utilization, the access rationale for parity regulation may be misguided, although proponents of parity legislation still may argue for these laws on the basis of evidence that it improves risk protection (Goldman et al. 2006; Barry and Busch 2007) .
This paper begins with a discussion of the economic theory behind differential costsharing for mental health and summarizes the prior literature on parity. We hypothesize that once the ERISA exemption is controlled for, state parity laws will result in: 1) an increase in mental health care utilization; 2) a relatively greater increase in use among lowincome individuals; and 3) a relatively greater increase in use among those with a greater need for services.
In the second part of the paper, we present empirical evidence testing these hypotheses using the National Survey of America's Families (NSAF). We use a difference-indifferences model and compare changes in mental health care utilization pre-and postparity law implementation to changes in utilization in states that did not pass parity laws. This research differs from previous studies on the effects of state parity in that we are the first to control for an individual's employer size, allowing us to better account for ERISA and small employer exemptions included in state policies.
Economic Explanations for Mental Health Insurance Limits
Some argue that private insurance coverage for mental health should be more limited than coverage for general health care due to concerns that extensive mental health coverage would be both a costly and inefficient allocation of health care resources. The most definitive evidence that better mental health coverage would increase demand came from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment. The HIE demonstrated that increased use of services by consumers in response to decreased cost-sharing for ambulatory mental health care was roughly double that observed for outpatient medical services under fee-forservice insurance (Manning, Wells, and Buchanan 1989; Newhouse 1993) . Manning and Marquis (1992) estimated that 50% costsharing for psychotherapy was optimal on the basis of the HIE results.
Importantly, the demand response noted in the HIE may no longer be a valid justification for discrepancies in coverage in the era of managed care. If managed care effectively controls consumer demand response, benefits can be expanded and out-of-pocket treatment costs can be lowered without prompting large increases in service use. Recent successes in expanding mental health insurance coverage without triggering substantial cost increases provide evidence that traditional moral hazard concerns may be less pressing given the proliferation of managed mental health care (Goldman et al. 2006; Ma and McGuire 1998; Goldman, McCulloch, and Sturm 1998) . Based on this research, parity could have the effect of increasing risk protection and improving the efficiency of the health insurance market.
Further evidence that differential costsharing may no longer be optimal comes from Meyerhoefer and Zuvekas (2006) . This research suggests that the price elasticity of mental health visits has declined substantially since the HIE with demand for mental health visits now slightly less elastic than general health care visits. They attribute this to changes in medical technology, changes in the insurance market (i.e., increases in managed care), and the growing role of the public sector in financing mental health care. This research suggests individuals would have relatively small behavioral responses to reduction in out-of-pocket cost-sharing for mental health services.
Adverse selection constitutes a second explanation for differences in the level of mental health and general medical coverage available under private insurance. Mental illnesses are often persistent, and individuals with these disorders tend to use other health services at higher rates compared to otherwise similar individuals (Ellis 1988 ). Since more generous coverage appears to attract these costlier users, insurers have a financial incentive to compete to avoid enrolling them by providing minimal mental health benefits (Frank and McGuire 2000) . Proponents of parity legislation argue that by requiring equivalent coverage for treatment of mental health disorders, parity regulation will counteract selection-related market competition.
Previous Literature
Most studies of the effects of parity laws indicate that these policies have little or no effect on use of mental health services. The single study to find effects of state parity laws on use indicated that these policies measurably increased utilization among the low and middle distress groups, but had no effect on the high distress group (Harris, Carpenter, and Bao 2006 ). An early analysis by Sturm (2000) using data from the Community Tracking Study (CTS) detected no statistically significant differences in insurance or perceived access to care among those living in parity and nonparity states. Using HealthCare for Communities (HCC) data, Pacula and Sturm (2000) found that state parity laws appear to have no aggregate impact on the level of utilization, and Bao and Sturm (2004) found no statistically significant effects of state parity laws on perceived quality of health insurance coverage, perceived access to needed health care, and use of mental health specialty services among those needing mental health care. An evaluation of comprehensive parity in the Federal Employees Health Benefits (FEHB) Program also found no effects on service use (Goldman et al. 2006 ).
Studies also have found no impact of mental health benefit expansions on total spending (Ma and McGuire 1998; Goldman, McCulloch, and Sturm 1998; Goldman et al. 2006) . The prior literature consistently indicates that the only major effect of parity is it significantly reduces the financial burden (e.g., out-of-pocket expenditures) of seeking mental health care (Barry and Busch 2007; Goldman et al. 2006) .
A criticism of prior studies on the effects of state parity mandates is their failure to account for small business and ERISA exemptions. Many state parity policies exempt small firms with fewer than 50 employees and nongroup insurance policies. In the United States, approximately 21% of individuals have private insurance sponsored by small employers (Kaiser Family Foundation 2006) , and 8% of the privately insured have individually purchased rather than group coverage (Collins et al. 2006) . Likewise, the ERISA law limits the reach of all state health care mandates by exempting employers that self-insure from state insurance regulations. This exemption greatly reduces the proportion of a state's population affected by parity. The Kaiser Family Foundation estimated that, in 2000, between 33% and 50% of employees in the United States were in selfinsured plans, and thus not covered by state regulation due to ERISA (Butler 2000) .
A study by Klick and Markowitz (2006) evaluating the impact of state parity laws on suicide rates did account for the ERISA exemption. This state-level analysis controls for the fraction of the state's workforce employed in large firms during the relevant year as a rough proxy for self-insuring. The authors argued that because large employers are more likely to self-insure, firm size serves as a valid measure of the effect of the ERISA exemption in a state. While this strategy is an improvement over previous studies that ignore the ERISA exemption, it still may be subject to substantial measurement error since the employer size variable is only available at the state level. Another state-mandated benefit study (Liu, Dow, and Norton 2004) accounted for ERISA in evaluating the impact of drivethrough maternity delivery laws by interacting the passage of these laws with time-invariant state-specific measures of the share of privately insured individuals not in self-insured plans. As a comparison, they also examine the impact of a federal law, whose effect would not be diluted by ERISA. These researchers find that ERISA substantially diluted the estimated impact of the drive-through delivery policies.
Research Questions
In this paper, we isolate the population most likely to be affected by state parity laws by estimating the effects on use of mental health services separately by employer size. Our goal is to fill a gap in prior studies by taking into account whether an individual would be exempt from state parity regulations. As described later in detail, we estimate the likelihood that a specific individual will be exempt from parity due to either working for a small business or to ERISA, using data available on the size of the individual's employer.
Applying this new approach, we also study distributional effects of state parity laws. We examine whether parity differentially affects low-income individuals and those with more severe mental health conditions. First, we hypothesize that parity laws might prove particularly beneficial to low-income individuals since this population is more seriously affected by financial barriers to care compared to the general population. The RAND HIE suggests that for general outpatient health care services, low-income individuals are more responsive to cost-sharing, although this was not found for mental health services (Newhouse 1993) .
Second, we expect to find a differential effect among individuals with more severe mental health conditions. Prior studies have failed to find increases in access rates, and have concluded that access is unchanged. An alternate explanation is that the net effect of access changes is approximately zero (that is, improved access for some, reduced access for others). Parity regulations appear to increase managed care for mental health services (Barry and Ridgely 2008) since health plans no longer can rely on demand-side constraints to keep service use at an efficient level. If increases in managed care alter supply-side constraints, services may be reallocated across individuals. This might occur, for example, if utilization review effectively bars individuals with low need from receiving services. We test the hypothesis that increased managed care in response to parity results in an increase in service use among those with more severe disorders and a decrease in service use for those with less severe need. Under this scenario, parity regulation may lead to reduced access for some individuals without diagnosed disorders who previously received services.
This re-allocation would be especially welcome in mental health care given the historical mismatch between service need and service use. The Surgeon General's Report on Mental Health (U.S. DHHS 1999) highlighted this misallocation, noting that of the 28% of the population diagnosed with a mental /addictive disorder in one year, only about 30% receive any treatment. Moreover, of the 15% of the population receiving services, about 40% have no diagnosable disorder.
Data and Methods

Data
Data for this study came from the National Survey of America's Families (NSAF). The NSAF is representative of the civilian, noninstitutionalized population under age 65 in 13 states, and respondents were chosen to represent a diversity of public programs and demographic characteristics (Abi-Habib, Safir, and Triplett 2002; Kenney et al. 1999 ). These 13 states represent over half the U.S. population. While most households are surveyed through a random-digit telephone sample, the survey design also includes households without telephones and oversamples low-income households. Three cross sections are available : 1997, 1999, and 2001. For each state in each year, approximately 4,500 to 5,000 adults were interviewed. Interviews were conducted by computerassisted telephone interviewing. Questions with significant nonresponse (e.g., income) were imputed using a standard ''hot deck'' method. 1 Data on state parity laws were obtained through the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill Web site (2007) (Gitterman et al. 2001; Peck and Scheffler 2002) , and a review of state statutes.
Data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Insurance Component (MEPS-IC) provided information on the probability that a firm of a given size, in a given state and year, self-insured at least one plan. The MEPS-IC is a large, nationally representative survey of private sector establishments conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census for the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. We present this information to better understand which individuals are likely to be employed by firms that self-insure.
Defining Parity
In practice, there are some challenges to studying the effects of state parity laws. As noted earlier, state parity laws are quite heterogeneous, and there is substantial variation in the state parity literature on how to categorize these laws. In this study, we employ moderately strict criteria for defining a parity state. States with parity laws that apply only to state employees, mirror the federal law, or allow insurers to retain inpatient day or outpatient visit limits are not considered parity states in this analysis. Using these criteria, we categorize five of the 13 states in the NSAF data as having implemented parity during the study period. Table 1 includes descriptive information on the year each of the five states implemented parity and whether the regulation applies solely to severe disorders. Under state parity laws, severe mental illnesses (sometimes referred to as biologically based disorders) typically include schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, major depression, and sometimes autism, anorexia/bulimia, obsessive compulsive disorder, and panic disorder.
Measures
To assess a respondent's access to mental health services, we construct a dichotomous variable indicating whether the adult used mental health services in the previous year. The question used in the NSAF specifically asked about mental health services received from a doctor, mental health counselor or therapist during the past 12 months. 2 In most households, questions on health insurance and health care utilization were randomly asked of one adult in the household. 3 We control for individual characteristics that are likely to affect our outcome measures but are unrelated to state parity laws. Demographic characteristics include whether a respondent is low income (income below 200% of the federal poverty line) and whether the respondent has a disability that limits functioning. We also control for a respondent's education, race, ethnicity, gender, age, and mental health status. The mental health status variable collected in the NSAF is adapted from the five-item scale used in the Medical Outcomes Study, the MHI-5 (Wells et al. 1996) . The five questions assessed anxiety, depression, loss of behavior or emotional control, and psychological wellbeing in the past month on a Likert scale. For example, respondents were asked, ''How much of the time during the past month have you been a very nervous person?'' Responses included: all of the time (1), some of the time (2), most of the time (3), or none of the time (4). Responses were summed to obtain a mental health score ranging from 4 to 20, which then was multiplied by 5 to obtain a score ranging from 20 to 100. On the basis of prior work, we consider respondents with a score lower than 67 to have poor mental health (Berwick et al. 1991; McCabe et al. 1996; McHorney, Ware, and Raczek 1993) .
We also include information on the size of the respondent's employer. The specific question asked in the NSAF is: ''About how many people are employed at the place where you work?'' We categorize individuals into firms with 50 to 100 employees, 100 to 500 employees, or 500 or more employees. Direct information on whether the respondent's employer self-insures is not available. We exclude individuals in firms with one to 49 employees. Of the five states enacting parity during the time period considered here, four included an exemption for the smallest firms with fewer than 50 employees.
Sample Selection
We limit our sample to adults with private insurance coverage. Because three of the five parity states we consider only apply their regulation to employer-sponsored health insurance, we limit the sample to adults with employer-sponsored coverage. We exclude individuals (and their spouses) who are selfemployed, unpaid workers, occasional workers, and government employees. NSAF does not include employer size information for these excluded groups. However, since benefits for these individuals are not affected by state parity laws, it is correct to omit them from the analysis.
Estimation Strategy
To estimate the effect of parity, we use a pooled cross-sectional data analysis. We exploit the fact that we have multiple cross sections of data and that state parity laws were implemented in different years. We implicitly compare mental health care utilization before and after parity implementation using nonparity states as a comparison group to control for secular trends in use of mental health care. We employ logistic regression and correct standard errors for clustering at the state level (Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan 2004) .
The equation estimated takes the form: mental health use in a state. Likewise, year fixed effects control for nationwide secular trends in mental health care use. By including these indicators, the coefficient on parity represents within-state differences in mental health care use pre-parity versus post-parity implementation, compared with changes in utilization rates in states that failed to enact parity legislation. The advantage of this methodology is that we avoid bias from state-level factors that may be correlated with both parity enactment and mental health care utilization. For example, passage of parity likely is correlated with many factors that are not observable to the researcher and which also are correlated with the outcomes of interest. Level of stigma is one example of a factor that might be heterogeneous across states that could affect both the likelihood of a state enacting a parity policy and the level of mental health services used within a state.
We run a series of regressions to estimate the impact of parity on mental health care utilization. Although previous work has found no significant impact of parity on use of health care services, we make several improvements over these prior studies. First, to allow us to readily compare our results to prior research, we run models similar to previous work, but use the NSAF data. These models include no controls for employer size.
Because larger employers are more likely to self-insure, however, we then stratify by the individual's employer size. We expect greater effects of parity on smaller employers, who are less likely to self-insure. In additional specifications, we examine the impact of parity on lowincome individuals and on individuals in poor mental health as measured by the respondents' scores on the MHI-5 questionnaire. Table 2 reports the weighted unadjusted descriptive statistics for the full sample of privately insured individuals employed in firms with more than 50 workers. We compare characteristics of the full sample to those in states with no parity laws (never parity), those in the state of Minnesota with parity over the entire study period (always parity), and those in the five states that passed parity laws during the study period (separated into two groups: before [preparity] and after [post-parity] implementation). We do not observe big differences in the distribution of characteristics across groups. We do detect a small (.6 percentage-point) increase in the proportion with any mental health visit after implementation among the five parity states.
Results
We find, however, some differences among the subgroups of interest. We find that 5.3% of low-income individuals and 7.5% of nonlow-income individuals had a mental health visit (Figure 1 ). While these percentages are similar, they mask the fact that low-income individuals are more likely to have a need for mental health services. If we limit the sample to those with a need for services (measured by their MHI-5 score), we find that 11.7% of low-income individuals and 19.6% of nonlow-income individuals had at least one mental health visit, suggesting a higher level of unmet need for mental health care among low-income individuals (Figure 1) . These results are consistent with prior research indicating low rates of mental health service use in the general population. Note that our measure may not capture all individuals with need. Likewise, some individuals using mental health services no longer may have demonstrated need based on MHI-5 scores if treatment is effective. These caveats aside, such low rates of service use among individuals with a need for services are particularly notable in a privately insured population.
We also examine whether those individuals whose mental health score indicated a need for services are those who received services. As noted earlier, the Surgeon General's report on mental health (U.S. DHHS 1999) indicated that allocation of mental health services according to need was problematic. We find similar patterns in these data. Among those in our sample with a mental health visit, only 26.4% were in poor mental health. (The caveats noted previously with our measure of mental health status still apply.)
In Table 3 , we examine how the ERISA exemption impacts the likelihood that an individual is affected by a state parity law using firm data on self-insuring collected in the MEPS-IC survey. 4 For each of the five states that implemented a parity law during our study period, we present estimates from the MEPS-IC of the share of firms selfinsuring by employer size. At the national level and in the five states in our study, the share of firms that self-insure increased substantially as employer size increased. Averaging across all states with MEPS-IC information, 12% of firms with fewer than 100 employees self-insure, 30% of firms with 100 to 500 employees self-insure, and 79% of firms with more than 500 employees selfinsure (AHRQ 2002) .
The top row of Table 4 shows the share of the NSAF sample living in a parity state in each of our three study years. Since many of those in parity states are not covered by these laws due to ERISA, we show in the second row the expected share of the population covered under parity excluding those in firms likely to self-insure. This calculation is based on an individual's employer size and the share of employers in that state/year that self-insure using the MEPS-IC estimates described earlier. This exclusion greatly reduces the share of the population affected by state parity laws. In 1997, while 4.6% of our sample population lived in a parity state, only 2.1% were expected to be covered by the law. By 2002, 44% of those in our sample lived in a parity state, with only 27% expected to be Table 2 . Weighted descriptive statistics using three waves of NSAF data (1997, 1999, and 2002) Notes: Sample was restricted to adults with employer-sponsored private insurance coverage, in firms with more than 50 employees. Individuals who are self-employed, unpaid workers, occasional workers or government employees are also excluded. a We define ''never parity'' states as those that did not implement a parity law either prior to or during our study period (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) . b We define ''always parity'' states as those that implemented a parity law prior to the start of our study period.
covered. In each study year, only about half of respondents living in parity states were likely to be subject to these mandates.
In Table 5 , we present regression results predicting use of any mental health services. In column 1, we replicate the approach used in prior studies without controlling for an individual's employer size. Like prior research, we find that parity has no significant impact on use of mental health services. Next, we run the same model including firm size control variables (column 2). In this model, the odds ratio for parity remains the same and the controls for employer size are not significant, suggesting that there are few differences in use of any mental health services across employer size groups.
In columns 3 to 5, however, we stratify our analysis by employer size. As hypothesized, we see significant differences by employer size. The regression results in column 3 indicate that individuals in smaller firms (50 to 100 employees) were more likely to use mental health services after implementation of state parity. To better understand the magnitude of this effect, we compute the marginal probability at the sample means. The odds ratio translates into a 3.2-percentage-point increase in the probability of using any mental health services for employees of smaller firms as a result of state parity implementation. State parity laws had no effect among larger firms (regression results in columns 4 and 5).
In Table 6 , we examine whether parity differentially affected use of mental health care among low-income respondents (,200% FPL). In column 1, we include the interaction of parity and whether the individual lived in a low-income household for the full sample. As in the prior regressions, we find that being in poor mental health is a significant predictor of using mental health services. Being low income is negative but insignificant in most models. Examining whether there is a differential effect of parity on low-income individ- a We calculate the share of our sample covered by state parity laws excluding those in firms likely to self-insure based on an individual's employer size and the share of employers in that state year that self-insure using the MEPS-IC estimates described in Table 3 . uals, we find that the interaction term is not significant. The total effect of parity for the low-income adults (the sum of the parity and parity* low-income coefficients) is also insignificant. We next stratify the sample by employer size. Examining the effect for the smaller employers (column 2), the odds ratio for the interaction of parity and low income is larger in magnitude than in the prior model, and significant at the 5% level. The effect of parity for low income (the sum of parity and parity*low income) is significant at the 1% level. To interpret these coefficients, we estimate the marginal effect of parity for the low-income group. We find that low-income individuals in parity states had a 5-percentage-point increase in the probability of use of mental health services (from 6% to 11%). That the odds ratio for the parity variable is insignificant suggests that most of the effect of state parity laws is focused in low-income households. Once again, we find no significant effects for the medium or large employers (columns 3 and 4), with effect sizes close to zero. Table 7 reports on whether parity differentially affected use of mental health care among those in poor mental health. Once again, we see the effect of parity concentrated among the smaller employers. We find that, for those working for smaller employers, parity significantly increases use among those in poor mental health. For this group, the effect is large-although only marginally statistically significant.
Discussion
In this paper, we study the effect of state parity laws, employing a new method to control for individuals' likelihood of being exempt from state mandates due to ERISA. Our results indicate that state parity enact- ment leads to several utilization changes undetected in prior research. Most notably, we find significant effects of state parity laws on use among the subgroup of employees who work for smaller firms. Firms with 50 to 100 employees are too large to qualify for the small employer exemptions included in most state parity statutes, but too small to selfinsure. Among this smaller employer group, our results suggest that most of the effect of state parity is concentrated among lowerincome individuals. The effect of state parity among those in poor mental health is only borderline significant.
While this research improves upon prior work, several limitations are worth noting. First, our measure of mental health status is less ideal than a clinical indicator tied to specific diagnoses. Second, our approach for dealing with ERISA is somewhat less precise than directly observing whether an individual is exempt from parity due to employment with a self-insured firm. To our knowledge, a more precise measure of self-insuring is not available in a large, multistate, multiyear survey. Third, there is some concern that our mental health measure may be correlated with service use. That is, use of services may lead to improvements in individuals' mental health scores. Fourth, we do not have information indicating specifically whether employers complied with parity laws. We are careful to only consider a state as having a parity law in effect if the law was implemented (rather than just enacted). It is possible that the absence of utilization changes in some groups is due to lags in implementation by employers. Fifth, our measure of mental health visits asks the respondent to consider visits in the past 12 months, which may have resulted in some recall bias. If this bias is similar in all three waves, this is unlikely to affect our estimates of the impact of parity. Finally, the parity regulation that four of the five states enacted over our study period applies to severe mental illnesses only. We examine a broader population of users to detect an effect on access. However, it is not clear how strictly insurers adhere to the severe disorders-only component of these laws. This work has relevance not only to the mental health parity literature but also to the broader literature on state mandates. We find that only about half of privately insured individuals are covered by state parity laws due to the ERISA exemption. All state health mandates are subject to this same exclusion.
Our results indicate a large change in the estimated impact of parity due to better classification of individuals likely to be exempt from these laws.
While our results suggest state parity mandates are more likely to affect employers of smaller firms, the ERISA exemption is not the only plausible explanation for these findings. If smaller employers offer poorer mental health coverage (compared with large employers) in the absence of parity, they might be required to expand their benefits more to comply after implementation of state parity. We think it is less probable that differential mental health benefits among small and large employers in the pre-period explain our results. First, our sample includes only individuals with employer-sponsored private coverage, and much of the difference between smaller firms and larger firms is in the decision to offer coverage. Second, that the employer size indicators included in the full sample were small and insignificant suggests benefits are similar in the pre-parity period. Finally, one can glean some information on this issue from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) National Compensation Survey. These data indicate that, in 2002, firms with 100 or more workers were slightly more likely to have special limits on mental health care, with 91% of larger employers subject to separate limits, and 87% of smaller employers subject to separate limits (U.S. DOL 2005) .
Our finding that low-income individuals working in smaller firms are more likely to use mental health services after parity is particularly noteworthy given the historical allocation of psychotherapy toward higherincome groups under indemnity insurance arrangements. One concern about parity was that broadening mental health insurance coverage would effectively redistribute income from lower-to upper-income groups, since higher-income individuals use more health services (McGuire 2001) . Our results suggest the opposite conclusion-that state parity laws disproportionately benefit those with lower incomes.
We do not find strong evidence that state parity laws increased use of services among those in poor mental health. Even among those working in smaller firms, the effect was only significant at the 10% level. Unfortunately, our ability to detect effects among those in poorer mental health working in smaller firms is limited due to sample size. Among the subgroup of those in small firms (N53,237), only 79 individuals living in a state that implemented parity during our study period were in poor mental health. A significant effect of parity on use might have been identified in a larger sample.
The fact that state parity effects on use are detected in smaller employer groups has two important policy implications. First, while extensive research evidence indicates that parity does not significantly increase costs overall in a managed care environment, our research suggests that increased service use due to parity may result in higher costs for smaller employers. It could be that smaller firms are less adept at using techniques such as managed care to control increased demand in response to insurance expansion. One policy response is to subsidize the cost of implementing benefit regulation for smaller employers. The New York State Legislature opted for this approach when it enacted a state parity law in December 2006. This state law included a provision requiring the state to fully offset the costs of the mandate on the smallest firms with 50 or fewer employees. Second, this finding illustrates the limited reach of state mandates. Over the last 15 years, many states legislatures have been quite active in passing a range of state health mandates. While states may be helpful as laboratories for testing innovative policy alternatives or circumventing gridlock in the federal policy process, state mandates do not function as an equivalent alternative to federal law.
Notes 1 In 1999, there was some overlap in sampling with 1997. It is not possible to identify or connect these households; this may lead to some increase in nonresponse bias or respondent conditioning between these two years (Abi-Habib, Safir, and Triplett 2002) . 2 The specific question is, ''During the past 12 months, how many times have you received mental health services, including mental health services received from a doctor, mental health counselor or therapist (and do not include treatment for substance abuse or smoking cessation)?'' 3 For 342 childless households, these questions were asked of up to two unrelated adults; we omit these duplicate households from our analyses. 4 More information on the MEPS-IC survey is available at: http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/ mepsweb/survey_comp/ic_data_collection.jsp
